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Upper Classes and Immorality: Ecological Validation of 50 Years of Power
Research
Abstract
Does power corrupt? Scholars have examined this causality with mixed results. This
study uses the World Value Survey (WVS) database to examine the power-corruption
link across cultures and time. The WVS inquires respondents’ justification for moral
domains of purity/sanctity, authority/respect, and fairness/reciprocity. Power is
operationalized as belonging to the upper-class. The study provides evidence that
the upper-class respondents are significantly more justifying of breaking moral rules
across world regions. But results also indicate that morality of upper classes is
diverging with time from the rest of the population, narrowing in some countries,
and widening in others. A discussion on the implications of these findings and the
need to monitor the morality of those in power is provided.
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Introduction
“Power corrupts.” Socrates’ apothegm appears even more valid today1. Scandals pertaining
to morality repeatedly occur among government heads, business leaders, sports
champions, spiritual leaders of various religious denominations, elite scholars, and
celebrities. Is it merely those scandals are more often reported in recent years, or are our
elites increasingly likely to succumb to temptation and corruption? How bad is the situation?
This study uses social class as a proxy for power, and especially focuses on the link between
upper-class appurtenance and morality. The article is organized in three sections: first, I
provide definitions of morality, power in general, and power obtained from ones’ group
appurtenance. Especially of interest here is social class, whose appurtenance is associated
to a change in morality. In the second section, I summarize the literature that associates
morality domains (Moral Foundation Theory; Graham et al., 2011; Haidt, 1995; Haidt &
Joseph, 2004) to individual power first, and then to social class. I then use the World Value
Survey (WVS), a database of self-reported values from 99 countries, to closely examine if
upper-class respondents from each country differ from their fellow countrymen and women
in the assessment of cheating, respecting rules, and sexual behaviors. In conclusion, I
assess the validity of the “power corrupts” adage across time.

Theories on Morality and Power
What is Morality?
Defining morality is never easy, as attested by the endless list of philosophers who have
tried. According to Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Voltaire, and later Karl Marx, men are good by
nature but can potentially become depraved by society, thus requiring a social contract.
These thoughts led to the principles of universal human rights to enjoy freedom and selfdetermination. The utilitarianism school of Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill focused on
the inner moral inclination toward empathic feelings; the alleviation of suffering should be
the source of all morality. Such thoughts have led to anti-slavery movements, women’s
emancipation, and the “right to pursue happiness” enshrined in the US constitution.
Developmental psychologists also located the origin of moral thoughts either in a social
contract or in the individuals’ inner ability to reciprocate and treat others equally (for reviews
see Gibbs, Basinger, Grime, & Snarey, 2007; and Wendorf, 2001). Piaget and Kohlberg
recognized that, together with the cognitive development stages of children, emerges the
ability to understand (culture specific) moral issues and to behave accordingly (Kohlberg,
1973, 1984; Piaget, 1932/1948). However, Kohlberg together with Turiel further argue that
the most advanced form of morality goes beyond blind acceptance of social conventions:
the experience of Nazi Germany demonstrates that it is in the capacity to reject social rules,
1

In the Republic (Book VIII), Plato explains how political leaders become corrupted by power, thus
leading to tyranny.

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2011

3

Online Readings in Psychology and Culture, Unit 4, Subunit 4, Chapter 9

authority, and loyalty to one’s in-group where lays a true morality, one based on life, justice,
and liberty, at the apex or “principled” level of cognitive development (Kohlberg, 1973; Turiel,
1966, 1983).
The “empiricist view” that morality is learnt from childhood has been challenged by a
“nativist view” (e.g., Haidt & Joseph, 2004) that argues morality precedes education, and is
ingrained in the human mind as an outcome of evolution (Darwin, 1859). Evolutionary
psychologists have proposed morality evolved among humans to regulate group functioning
(Tooby & Cosmides, 1992). For example, humans have developed inner abilities to detect
cheaters (Cosmides & Tooby, 2005), laying the moral ground for equity (i.e., others should
be treated with fairness and justice; Haidt & Joseph, 2004), and they have evolved the ability
to care for group members, laying the moral ground for empathy (i.e., one should be kind
and compassionate with others; Haidt & Joseph, 2004). From this nativist standpoint, moral
judgments come to mind without rational thinking; they elicit emotional reactions (Greene,
Nystrom, Engell, Darley, & Cohen, 2004; Haidt, 2003; Huebner, Dwyer, & Hauser, 2009;
Turner & Stets, 2007) and they are intuitive (Federico, Weber, Ergun, & Hunt, 2013; Haidt
& Joseph, 2004). Therefore, defining morality solely along the dimensions of life, justice, and
liberty, as proposed by Kohlberg and Turiel might be particular to WEIRD (western,
educated, industrialized, rich, and democratic; Henrich, Heine, & Norenzayan, 2010), liberal,
and Judeo-Christian societies.
Starting from moral intuitions and enlarging their sample to include various cultures, Haidt
and Joseph observed that morality involves a wide range of social regulations beyond just
equity and empathy (2004). This new line of research, also called the Moral Foundation
Theory (MFT; Graham et al., 2011; Haidt, 1995; Haidt & Joseph, 2004) suggests five
universally observable domains of moral judgment: harm/care (with empathy at its core),
fairness/reciprocity (which covers equity), in-group/loyalty (which prioritizes same-group
members and self-sacrifice for the group), authority/respect (concerned with order and social
hierarchy), and purity/sanctity (related with physical or spiritual contagion and disgust,
sexual chastity and desire). These domains have been grouped into individualizing
foundations, i.e., harm and fairness, and socially binding foundations, i.e., respect for
authority, loyalty to group, and purity (Weber & Federico, 2013).
Therefore, a multi-dimensional definition of morality is required to ensure crosscultural validity of a morality study. Because the strength and types of social bonds differ
across cultures (Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Schug, Yuki, & Maddux, 2010), the
characteristics of morality, as of the social contract, also vary across cultures (Rai & Fiske,
2011). For example, Confucianism, the founding moral philosophy in many Asian societies,
treats the respect for hierarchy and authority as its highest virtue, at the apex of morality
(Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Nisbett, 2003). Studies in India (e.g., Mahalingam, 2007), among
liberals and conservatives in the USA (e.g., Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009), or lower classes
in Brazil and the USA (e.g., Haidt, Koller, & Diaz, 1993), indicate various levels of moral
concerns about purity, degradation, hierarchical deference and loyalty to a national or ethnic
group. Although research on the ethology of mammalian species suggests empathy, respect
for authority, and equity might have been inherited from our pre-human ancestors (de Waal,
1982, 2006), the relative importance given to each moral domain varies with social
https://scholarworks.gvsu.edu/orpc/vol4/iss4/9
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environment. For these reasons, this cross-cultural study will use the moral foundation
theory as a cross-cultural framework to analyze morality.

Power at the Individual Level and its Paradox
Philosophers Thomas Hobbes and Friedrich Nietzsche, and more recent psychologists (e.g.,
McClelland, 1961, 1970, 1975; Winter, 1973, 1991) recognized that individuals have a
motivation for power. Social hierarchy provides the evolved advantages of enhancing
cooperation and coordination in the group among primates (de Waal, 1982), and human
children as well (e.g., Barkow et al., 1975).
But psychologists have also warned that power should be channeled into responsible
behaviors, or it might just be used to increase personal gain (Winter, 1991). Maner and Mead
(2010) describe power-holding as a paradoxical social contract: instead of using one’s
asymmetric resources to benefit the group in totality, the powerful could potentially use their
position for self-benefit (or that of one’s family) at the expense of the larger group. As the
social contract in a society is embedded in moral rules and regulations, whether or not those
in power respect the social contract translates into whether or not they share morality with
the group. For those in power, moral deviance shall thus be considered as breaking their
end of the social contract. But power is not always granted according to characteristics such
as physical strength, ability to form coalitions, and personality traits. More commonly, power
derives from social structures (Sidanius, Pratto, van Laar, & Levin, 2004).

The Link Between Individual and Social Power
Although power has been defined as the ability to do (Berdahl & Martonara, 2006), or to
choose (Ng, 1980), prevalent definitions are centered on interpersonal relationships: the
ability to make others do (Sturm & Antonakis, 2015), to influence others (Copeland, 1994;
French & Raven, 1959), or to manipulate others (Keltner, Gruenfeld, & Anderson, 2003:
Kipnis, 1972). But power is not only the ability to influence others; it also stems from one’s
group appurtenance.
According to social identity theory, individuals define their identity from the group
they belong to (Tajfel & Turner, 1986) and derive self-esteem from the relative ranking of
their group (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherall, 1987). One key characteristic of
social groups is their power entitlement: genders, classes, castes, clans, economic and
educational standings, as well as kinship structures involve social ranking (Bourdieu, 1991),
which individuals are readily able to recognize (Anderson, Srivastava, Beer, Spataro, &
Chatman, 2006). Such willingness to maintain hierarchy among social groups appears to be
an evolved human capacity (Barkow et al., 1975), theorized as social dominance (Sidanius
et al., 2004; Pratto, Sidanius, & Levin, 2006). In a word, group appurtenance is an indicator
of social power.
Finally, individual power leads to group power. Not only are groups of individuals with
power, by simple aggregation, more powerful than other groups, but also individual- and
group-identities are both linked to individuals’ appreciation of social hierarchy. For example,
individuals with high social dominance orientation (i.e., endorsement of social hierarchy)
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2011
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tend to choose careers in organizations with hierarchical structures (e.g., army and police)
rather than horizontal structures (e.g., civil liberty organizations; Haley & Sidanius, 2005;
Sidanius, van Laar, Levin, & Sinclair, 2003). And the sense of power is consistent across
social interactions (Anderson, John, & Keltner, 2011; Kenny & Zaccaro, 1983; Zaccaro, Foti,
& Kenny, 1991). In sum, power at individual- and group-level is interconnected.

Social Class as Power
Social class has a profound effect on social life (Durkheim, 1802/1984; Fiske & Markus,
2011; Marx & Engels, 1848/1973). According to the class struggle theory (Marx & Engels,
1848/1973), social groups are formed according to their ability to obtain and maintain
asymmetric access to economic and political resources, a definition that directly echoes that
of power at the individual level. In the US, perceived power and social class are significantly
correlated (Anderson et al., 2006).
Evidence also shows that social classes affect health, cognitive functioning, and
behavior. Social classes emerge through shared experience—at school, at work, or in
marriage, with individuals from the same social background—and it determines one’s
access to resources (Oakes & Rossi, 2003) and freedom of choice (Snibbe & Markus, 2005;
Stephens, Markus, & Townsend, 2007). Moreover, social class appurtenance strongly
correlates to health (Adler et al., 1994; Adler, Epel, Castellazzo, & Ickovics, 2000) and social
anxiety (Wilkinson, 1999). When exposed to nasal drops of rhinovirus and influenza virus,
healthy subjects who perceive that they belong to a lower social class (subjective measure),
but not those with lower salary (objective measure of social class) presented significantly
more symptoms of cold and clinical illness (Cohen, Alper, Doyle, Adler, & Treanor, 2008).
Furthermore, parental socioeconomic status (SES) appears to affect children’s health, itself
leading to children having lower SES at adult age (Currie, 2009).
Social class appurtenance also affects cognition and behavior. Members of the
higher social classes tend to essentialize social categories and behaviors as inherent and
stable, based on ingrained and genetic characteristics of individuals (Keller, 2005), while
members of the lower classes tend to contextualize social categories and behaviors as
flexible and constructed by social experience (Kraus, 2010; Mahalingam, 2003, 2007). Thus,
higher-class members tend to favor personal abilities and neglect social
interconnectedness. Studies on agency indicate that working (lower) class respondents
favor social conformity and connection to others when performing the task of choosing a
pen, while middle class respondents would rather opt for differentiation (Stephens et al.,
2007). In another study on agency, Hurricane Katrina survivors were asked what guided
their choice of staying or evacuating. Those who evacuated (who were mostly of a higher
SES) were guided by a sense of independence and control, whereas those who refused to
evacuate (who were mostly of a lower SES) were guided by interdependence, strength, and
faith (Stephens, Hamedani, Markus, Bergsieker, & Eloul, 2009).

https://scholarworks.gvsu.edu/orpc/vol4/iss4/9
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Morality, Individual Power, and Social Class
The next section reviews the literature on the link of morality with individual power and with
social class. These two areas of study (i.e., individual power-morality, and social classmorality) have typically been two distinct fields of social psychology. But because individualand social class-levels of analysis are different, though highly interconnected, the two fields
deserve to be compared. The review is conducted separately for the five moral foundation
domains.
Harm/Care Domain
Harm/care and individual power. The infamous Stanford prison experiment and the
Milgram experiment at Yale University exemplify the extent to which bluntly immoral harming
of others by empowered individuals becomes possible (Haney, Banks, & Zimbardo, 1973;
Milgram, 1963). Altogether, 13.6% of US workers have reported being abused by
supervisors, including sexual harassment, physical violence, public ridiculing, etc. (Tepper,
2007). A large amount of studies have shown that, in experimental settings or in
organizations, individuals given power, or primed with power, tend to have less empathy for
others (for a summary see Sturm & Antonakis, 2015). Those given power tend to
dehumanize or objectify others (Gruenfeld, Inesi, Magee, & Galinsky, 2008; Gwinn, Judd, &
Park, 2013). Dehumanization itself is correlated to a greater willingness to torture in prison
settings (Haney et al., 1973; Milgram, 1963; Viki, Osgood, & Phillips, 2013). Individuals given
power over others tend to manipulate them (Kipnis, 1972), to express less compassion,
ignoring distress and suffering of others (Lammers, Galinsky, Gordijn, & Otten 2012; van
Kleef, Oveis, van der Löwe, LuoKogan, & Goetz, 2008), and tend to punish more severely
in retributive justice settings (van Prooijen, Coffeng, & Vermeer, 2014) compared to
individuals with less power.
Conversely, a handful of studies provide the opposite evidence that individual power
might improve moral judgment in the harm/care domain. For instance, power might increase
interpersonal sensitivity (Hall, Andrzejewski, & Yopchick, 2009; Schmid Mast, Jonas, & Hall,
2009), and those empowered might become altruistic, if they are other-oriented (Blader &
Chen, 2012; Chen, Lee-Chai, & Bargh, 2001), or if they are directed toward interpersonal
tasks (Copeland, 1994; Overbeck & Park, 2001, 2006). Finally, those in power are more
willing to help in situations of distress, as the less powerful are typically waiting for someone
to lead (Whitson, Galinsky, Magee, Gruenfeld, & Liljenquist, 2007).
Harm/care and social class. At the social class level, the assessment of the harm/care
moral foundation is more balanced. First, children’s moral development stages increase with
SES across cultures (Gibbs et al., 2007; Snarey, 1985). Higher SES children have more
“principled” levels of moral judgment: they are more passionate and empathic (Kohlberg,
1973; Turiel, 1966, 1983). High SES individuals in the USA also volunteer more than lower
classes (Penner, Dovidio, Piliavin, & Schroeder, 2005).
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However, various studies indicate higher social class might be associated to more harming
and less caring. Higher SES individuals are less likely to “moralize” their behavior than lower
SES individuals (Ellemers, Pagliaro, Baretto, & Leach, 2008). Upper-class members’
economic autonomy and personal agency make them depend on others less than lower
classes do (Snibbe & Markus, 2005; Stephens et al., 2007). In chaotic situations, for
example, high SES individuals bank on their personal wealth, while lower class members
lean on their community (Piff, Stancato, Côté, Mendoza-Denton, & Keltner, 2012). More
directly, high SES individuals in the USA display lower levels of compassion than low SES
respondents (Stellar, Manzo, Kraus, & Keltner, 2012) and manifest less empathic accuracy
(Kraus, Côté, & Keltner, 2010). In a cooperation exercise, upper-class respondents give
40% less to anonymous partners, they are less trusting of others, less helpful to distressed
experimenters (Piff, Kraus, Côté, Cheng, & Keltner, 2010), they direct less attention to other
participants, have less eye contact, and laugh less (Kraus & Keltner, 2009) than lower class
respondents. They are also on average less polite with strangers than the lower classes
(Argyle, 1994). Moreover, upper-class members in the USA give on average 2.2% of their
income to charitable organization, whereas poorer class members give 4.6%, although a
larger percent of upper classes (70% vs. 30% for lower classes) do give (James & Sharpe,
2007). Finally, the individual measures of social dominance orientation (SDO), which is
higher among upper social classes (Sidanius, Levin, Liu, & Pratto, 2000), was negatively
correlated to the harm/care moral foundation (Federico, et al., 2013).
Fairness/Reciprocity Domain
Fairness/reciprocity and individual power. At the individual level, those in power tend to
satisfy their own needs at the expense of others (Keltner et al., 2003) and several studies
provide evidence of this non-equalitarian propensity (e.g., DeCelles, DeRue, Margolis, &
Ceranic, 2012; Dubois, Rucker, & Galinsky, 2015; Pitesa & Thau, 2013). Having power was
also correlated to cheating more if the power situation was stable (Kim, Shin, & Lee, 2015).
Fairness/reciprocity and social class. By definition, social hierarchy implies unequal
situations and therefore, less fairness and reciprocity between members of various social
classes. Ideologies that promote social hierarchy (e.g., social dominance) tend to support
inequality in society at large, and thereby tend to promote and legitimate prejudices and
discrimination (Sidanius et al., 2000). The inclination of upper-class members to validate
and justify inequality in an essentialist manner further legitimates social inequality (Keller,
2005; Kraus, 2010; Mahalingam, 2003, 2007). More directly, high SES is correlated to lower
fairness/reciprocity: upper-class members are more selfish (Dubois, et al., 2015). In
experiments, high SES individuals took more sweets intended for children, were more likely
to cheat in online games, and to lie in negotiation (Piff et al., 2012). Although this study has
been criticized (Francis, 2012), high SES also correlated to being more self-serving, and low
SES correlated to redistribution, especially if high SES individuals also have strong upperbody strength (Petersen, Sznycer, Sell, Cosmides, & Tooby, 2013).

https://scholarworks.gvsu.edu/orpc/vol4/iss4/9
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In-group/loyalty Domain
In-group/loyalty and individual power. Individuals given power feel more distant from
others (Kipnis, 1972; Lammers, et al., 2012; Magee & Smith, 2013), implying the weakness
of any possible link between power and in-group loyalty. For example, individuals with high
power confirm less the opinion of others when making a decision (Galinsky, Magee,
Gruenfeld, Whitson, & Liljenquist, 2008). However, a direct measure of the relationship
between in-group loyalty and individual power has yet to be conducted.
In-group/loyalty and social class. Social class, as demonstrated above, has a bearing on
individuals’ perception of in-group appurtenance: studies have shown that upper social class
members are more independent, have a higher sense of control, and are less prosocial in
general than lower class members (e.g., Kraus, Piff, & Keltner, 2009). No prior study,
however, tested if these conclusions apply to in-groups. Overall, the connection between ingroup loyalty and social class is not clear. Social dominance theory sheds a little more light:
Group appurtenance in general is the source of in-group bias (Tajfel & Turner, 1986; Turner
et al., 1987). For those with high SDO, e.g., upper-class members (Sidanius et al., 2000),
in-group bias is further enhanced (Pratto et al., 2006). Not only do legitimating myths of
social ranking increase bias among those in high social strata, but also the combination of
high SDO and high group-identification increases discrimination against out-group
subordinates (Pratto et al., 2006). Although a study shows that high SDO does not directly
correlate to in-group loyalty (Federico et al., 2013), evidence indicates that SDO enhances
in-groups’ hierarchical ranking (Haley & Sidanius, 2005).
Authority/Respect Domain
Authority/respect and individual power. The authority/respect domain is associated with
duties, obedience, respect, and maintenance of traditions (Graham et al., 2011). Powerful
individuals are expected to promote rules and regulations, not only to simplify decisionmaking processes (for cognitive ease; Fiske, 1993), but also because rules reinforce the
status quo (Sidanius, Pratto, Sinclair, & van Laar, 1996; Sidanius et al., 2004). In parallel,
the literature gathered ample evidence that those in power tend to become disinhibited and
therefore less respectful of social conveniences, rules, and regulations (Galinsky, Jordan, &
Sivanathan, 2008), whereas powerless individuals are more sensitive to threat and
punishment (Fiske, 1993). The approach/inhibition reasoning (Keltner et al., 2003) proposes
that powerful individuals are ready to take more risks (such as breaking rules), than
powerless individuals (Anderson & Galinsky, 2006; Galinsky et al., 2008).
Authority/respect and social class. Both the Marxist concept of class struggle (Marx &
Engels, 1848/1973; Marx, 1844/1964) and social dominance theory (Pratto et al., 2006;
Sidanius et al., 2004) propose that social hierarchy is maintained by those with higher rank.
Because dominant ideologies support the power system in place (Foucault & Gordon, 1980),
upper-class members would promote a moral foundation based on duties, traditions, and
obedience to secure compliance of the less powerful. However, evidence that social power
may enhance adherence to social rules is mixed. On the contrary, elevated social rank may
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2011
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reduce threat sensitivity and increase sense of control (Kraus et al., 2012), thereby reducing
threat-driven obedience to rules and regulations: high SES individuals tend to make more
driving infractions and exhibit more unethical behavior (Piff et al., 2012), especially when
that behavior benefits them (vs. others), and when their power was enhanced (Dubois et al.,
2015). This result, however, was not replicated with a large Dutch sample (Trautmann, van
de Kuilen, & Zeckhauser, 2013). The researchers explain the cultural variation by the
difference in the type of unethical behavior tested: the wealthier may cheat significantly more
on taxes, but they may not steal cars (nor cheat on social welfare, or in a trust game) more
than poorer individuals might. Results on social dominance are also mixed. High SDO
individuals endorse hierarchy and tend to choose careers in hierarchical organizations,
where respect of authority is required, such as the police or military (Haley & Sidanius,
2005). Person-occupation congruence (potentially expressed as respect for authority on the
job) increases efficacy at work (Sidanius et al., 1996). But the direct correlation between
SDO and the authority/respect moral foundation was not observed (Federico et al., 2013).
Purity/Sanctity Domain
Purity/sanctity and individual power. The purity/sanctity domain is associated with moral
judgment founded on physical or spiritual contagion, disgust, chastity, and desire (Haidt &
Joseph, 2004). Individuals in power do not particularly curb their desire, as having power is
associated to more sexual harassment behaviors (Bargh, Raymond, Pryor, & Strack, 1995).
But studies that inquire directly into the link between purity- and sanctity-related moral
judgments and individual power have yet to be conducted.
Purity/sanctity and social class. On the link between social class and purity/sanctity, one
rare study indicates that higher classes tend to “moralize” purity less than lower classes
(Horberg, Oveis, Keltner, & Cohen, 2009). However the direct measure of purity/sanctity
moral foundation was not correlated to social dominance (Federico et al., 2013). More
studies have observed a link between political orientation (conservative vs. liberal) and the
moral domain of purity/sanctity, but social class was not included in these studies.

Hypotheses
Although abundant and highly informative, research on the link between morality and
power/social class needs to be complimented. Its main weakness is that it was conducted
in WEIRD societies (Henrich et al., 2010) for the most part, and therefore lacks cross-cultural
validity (Kraus, Piff, & Keltner, 2011). Morality rules express the terms of the social contract
that is specific to that of each culture (Shweder, Mahapatra, & Miller, 1987). For example,
cultural variations in hierarchical and vertical dimensions (Singelis, Triandis, Bhawuk, &
Gelfand, 1995) might promote individualizing vs. socially binding moral foundations. The
acceptance of social hierarchy might also influence morality (e.g., Oyserman, 2006).
The main objective of this inquiry is to confirm if perceived appurtenance to upper
social classes affects moral judgments in all cultures similarly. As the great majority of prior
studies have observed a lower rating in empathy/compassion and equity/fairness among the
https://scholarworks.gvsu.edu/orpc/vol4/iss4/9
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upper classes, I hypothesize that these results can be extrapolated across cultures, and to
all moral domains because power increases the sense of personal control and reduces
socially binding behaviors (the “unrestricted” low morality hypothesis).
The process of modernization leads to changes in values (Inglehart & Baker, 2000).
According to these authors, industrialization leads to the replacement of traditional forms of
authority (e.g., religion) with secular forms (e.g., government) in a first step, before all forms
of authority are eventually replaced by emancipated individualization in the postmodern step
(Inglehart & Baker, 2000). Applying this rationale, the upper classes in highly industrialized
societies might adhere more to individualizing moral foundations such as equity and
empathy, than to socially binding moral foundations such as authority, purity, and in-group
loyalty (the “selective” low morality hypothesis).
Table 1.
Regions, Sub-regions and Countries sampled in the WVS (WVS, 2015; Geoscheme,
2006)
Africa

America

Asia

Europe

Oceania

Eastern
Africa:
Ethiopia,
Rwanda,
Zimbabwe,
Uganda,
Tanzania,
Zambia.

Central
America:
El Salvador,
Guatemala,
Mexico.

Central Asia:
Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan,
Uzbekistan.

Eastern Europe:
Bulgaria, Belarus,
Czech Republic,
Hungary, Moldova,
Poland, Romania,
Russia, Slovakia,
Ukraine.

Oceania:
Australia,
New
Zealand.

North Africa:
Algeria, Libya,
Egypt,
Morocco,
Tunisia.
South Africa:
South Africa.
Western
Africa:
Ghana, Mali,
Nigeria,
Burkina Faso.

Latin
America:
Dominican
Republic,
Puerto Rico,
Trinidad and
Tobago.
North
America:
Canada, USA.
South
America:
Argentine,
Brazil, Chile,
Colombia,
Ecuador,
Peru,
Uruguay,
Venezuela.

East Asia:
China, Taiwan,
Hong Kong, Japan,
South Korea.
South East Asia:
Indonesia,
Malaysia,
Philippines,
Singapore, Viet
Nam, Thailand.
Southern Asia
Bangladesh, India,
Iran, Pakistan.
Western Asia:
Azerbaijan,
Armenia, Bahrain,
Cyprus, Georgia,
Iraq, Israel, Jordan,
Kuwait, Lebanon,
Palestine, Qatar,
Saudi Arabia,
Turkey, Yemen.
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Northern Europe:
Estonia, Finland,
Latvia, Lithuania,
Norway, Sweden,
Great Britain
Southern Europe:
Albania, Andorra,
Bosnia, Croatia,
Italy, Montenegro,
Serbia, Slovenia,
Spain, Macedonia,
Serbia &
Montenegro.
Western Europe:
France, Germany,
Netherlands,
Switzerland.
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Measuring Class Power and Morality
The World Value Survey
The association between social class and morality is examined using data from the several
rounds of the WVS. The strength of the WVS is in its global coverage. The WVS includes
representative samples of 99 countries (Inglehart, Basanez, & Moreno, 1998), altogether
representing 90% of the world population (WVS, 2015). Although the WVS dataset does not
include the wide variety of sub-cultures or lifestyles existing in each country, this large
sample of 340,000 individuals provides an unrivaled sample of national cultures with diverse
economic-development levels, political systems, religious beliefs, social practices, as well
as diversity in ethnic and genetic factors. In this study, the concept of culture is therefore
understood as countries or national cultures. The countries are further grouped into five
regions and 18 geographical sub-regions (see Table 1) using the United Nations
Geoscheme classification (Geoscheme, 2006).
Furthermore, the WVS was obtained in six waves, from 1981-1984 to 2010-2014.
Each wave contains a different sample of countries: The first wave in 1981-1984 includes
eight countries (n = 10,307) and the last one in 2010-2014 includes 60 countries (n =
86,272). When a country appears in several waves, each wave is analyzed as one dataset,
because culture evolves with time. The dataset for each country and wave is called “case”
thereafter.

The WVS Measure of Social Class
The World Value Survey (WVS, 2015) database provides a (self-reported) measure of social
class. Respondents are asked to rate the social class to which they belong on a Likert scale,
ranging from lower-class, then working-class, middle-class (lower- and upper-middle-class
in few studies), to finally upper-class. Self-reported identification with the upper-class (UC)
ranges from 0.1% (Latvia and Burkina Faso) to 6.9% (Israel) of the respondents per country
(2.2% of the full sample or n = 6,702 respondents).
To characterize the upper-class respondents of the full sample, their gender, age,
education, and income levels were compared with the rest of the sample (Table 2), using a
Welch t-test (for unequal variance; Welch, 1947). Overall, respondents who identified as
upper-class fit a broad definition of elites whose power rests largely on economic resources
and high education. This study focuses on the subjective perception of upper-class
appurtenance. Research has shown that subjective feelings of power are enough to modify
attitudes (Anderson & Berdahl, 2002). And not only do objective measures of upper-class
appurtenance not always correlate to subjective measures (Kraus et al., 2009; Kraus et al.,
2011), but subjective measures have a bigger impact on life than objective ones (Adler et
al., 2000; Cohen et al., 2008).
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Table 2.
Demographics of Upper-Class Respondents and Populace
Variables

Populace a
M (SD)

Upper-class
M (SD)

Welch’s
t (df)

Gender b

0.48 (0.50)

0.53 (0.50)

-7.01
(304436)

<.001

-.06

-.03

-0.10

Age

40.8 (16.0)

37.8 (15.2)

15.61
(304121)

<.001

2.59

3.33

0.19

Education c

4.70 (2.23)

5.86 (2.15)

-39.55
(275363)

<.001

-1.22

-1.10

-0.53

Income d

4.57 (2.28)

6.62 (2.67)

-59.49
(282304)

<.001

-2.12

-1.98

-0.83

p

95% CI
LL
UL

Cohen’s
d

Note. CI = confidence interval; LL = lower limit; UL = upper limit. a 0 = female and 1 = male. a
Populace refers to the respondents who do not identify as upper classes. b Scale from 1 (primary
education not completed) to 8 (university degree obtained). c Scale from 1 (lowest income group
in the country) to 10 (highest income group in the country).

Morality Measures
I first provide a descriptive analysis of WVS morality items for upper classes and populace
(i.e., respondents who do not identify as upper-class) on the full sample and by region. In a
second step, the WVS dataset is used to construct a morality model aligned with the MFT
using exploratory and then confirmatory factor analysis.
Descriptive analysis
Respondents of the WVS are asked if they would justify a range of behaviors on a 1 - 10
Likert scale from 1 (always justifiable) to 10 (never justifiable). A sample item is “Avoiding a
fare on public transportation.” Table 3 provides means values of the morality items and the
Welch t-test comparison for the full sample and by region. On the full sample, upper-class
respondents agree significantly more than the other classes in justifying 12/23 various
behaviors such as accepting bribes (d = .19), sex under legal age of consent (d = .16),
fighting with the police (d = .15), and cheating on taxes (d = .15). However, upper classes
justify only one item significantly less than other classes (homosexuality, d = -.06). There is
no significant difference between upper-class and populace on other items.
Regional variations are observed: in Europe, America, Asia, and Africa, upper
classes justify significantly more than other classes from 8/23 (Asia) to 12/23 items (Africa)
per region (.37 > ds > .08), and significantly less than other classes from 0/23 items (Africa
and Europe) and 3/23 items (Asia) per region (-.09 > ds > -.16). In Oceania, there are no
significant differences between the upper class and the populace, except for claiming undue
government benefits (upper-class justify less than populace, d = -.43). In sum, upper classes
tend to justify “immoral” behaviors more than other classes, and regional differences such
as in Asia might be related to a definition of self that is socially interdependent (Markus &
Kitayama, 1991).

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2011

13

Online Readings in Psychology and Culture, Unit 4, Subunit 4, Chapter 9

Table 3
Mean, Standard Deviations and Welch t-test Comparison for Populace and Upper-class Groups, by Region, for the 23 Morality Items
of the WVS (n = 304637)
Items
World
Africa
America
Asia
Europe
Oceania
Items
World
Africa
America
Asia
Europe
Oceania
Items
World
Africa
America
Asia
Europe
Oceania
Items
World
Africa
America
Asia
Europe
Oceania

Homosexuality
Populace
Upper class
M (SD)
M (SD)
3.12*** (2.99)
2.95 (2.91)
2.05 (2.12)
2.46*** (2.53)
3.71*** (3.13)
3.21 (2.94)
2.30 (2.31)
2.52*** (2.60)
4.06 (3.44)
4.56*** (3.58)
5.50 (3.38)
4.71 (3.51)
Euthanasia
Populace
Upper class
M (SD)
M (SD)
3.68 (3.19)
3.64 (3.17)
2.48 (2.50)
3.35*** (3.02)
3.65 (3.20)
3.59 (3.16)
3.24 (2.98)
3.35 (3.03)
4.97 (3.34)
5.00 (3.41)
6.30 (3.07)
6.03 (3.39)
Killing in self-defense
Populace
Upper class
M (SD)
M (SD)
5.42 (3.52)
5.54 (3.45)
4.82 (3.60)
5.28 (3.51)
5.66 (3.55)
6.36*** (3.31)
5.32** (3.50)
4.94 (3.41)
5.35 (3.42)
5.43 (3.51)
a

a

Accepting a bribe
Populace
Upper class
M (SD)
M (SD)
1.80 (1.79)
2.19*** (2.69)
2.03 (2.03)
2.49** (2.49)
1.70 (1.71)
1.85 (1.97)
1.77 (1.75)
2.28*** (2.36)
1.82 (1.76)
1.98* (2.01)
1.41 (1.25)
1.29 (0.79)
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Prostitution
Populace
Upper class
M (SD)
M (SD)
2.59 (2.48)
2.69*** (2.62)
2.08 (2.11)
2.57*** (2.66)
2.87 (2.60)
2.63*** (2.43)
2.01 (1.98)
2.39*** (2.47)
3.11 (2.67)
3.69*** (2.93)
4.47 (2.84)
4.52 (3.31)

Sex under legal age
Populace
Upper class
M (SD)
M (SD)
2.25 (2.34)
2.65*** (2.59)
3.19 (2.97)
4.02* (3.16)
2.53 (2.58)
3.14*** (2.85)
1.66 (1.98)
1.79 (1.70)
2.25 (2.36)
3.18*** (2.95)
a

a

Divorce
Populace
M (SD)
4.61 (3.10)
3.72 (2.88)
5.15 (3.26)
3.67 (2.77)
5.87 (2.93)
6.51 (2.60)

Upper class
M (SD)
4.56 (3.12)
3.95** (3.30)
5.14 (3.31)
4.10*** (2.79)
6.04 (3.09)
6.02 (2.98)

Abortion
Upper class
M (SD)
3.53*** (2.92)
2.90*** (2.76)
3.18*** (2.82)
3.44*** (2.78)
5.05 (3.19)
5.36 (2.95)

Fighting with the police
Populace
Upper class
M (SD)
M (SD)
2.83 (2.47)
3.21*** (2.59)
2.83 (2.38)
3.80*** (2.81)
2.73 (2.58)
3.26*** (2.71)
3.06 (2.43)
3.12 (2.42)
2.56 (2.28)
2.93 (2.64)

Claiming undue benefits
Populace
Upper class
M (SD)
M (SD)
2.57 (2.45)
2.77*** (2.68)
2.41 (2.36)
2.70** (2.64)
2.72 (2.68)
3.04*** (2.95)
2.69 (2.47)
2.77 (2.65)
2.50 (2.29)
2.51 (2.44)
1.88*** (1.78)
1.23 (0.68)

Avoiding fare on public transport
Populace
Upper class
M (SD)
M (SD)
2.56 (2.41)
2.78*** (2.70)
2.42 (2.35)
2.77 (2.67)
2.92 (2.74)
2.90 (2.75)
2.27 (2.17)
2.70*** (2.68)
2.82 (2.48)
2.97 (2.70)
2.14 (1.87)
1.84 (1.95)

Cheating on taxes
Populace
Upper class
M (SD)
M (SD)
2.23 (2.18)
2.61*** (2.60)
2.20 (2.19)
2.65*** (2.59)
2.10 (2.14)
2.42** (2.48)
2.06 (2.03)
2.60*** (2.65)
2.61 (2.38)
2.88** (2.62)
2.07 (1.92)
1.98 (2.04)

Taking soft drugs
Populace
Upper class
M (SD)
M (SD)
1.49 (1.57)
1.62** (1.71)
1.98 (1.96)
2.05 (2.01)
1.63 (1.84)
1.81* (1.98)
1.24 (1.02)
1.29 (1.08)
1.54 (1.65)
2.09** (2.33)

Throwing away litter
Populace
Upper class
M (SD)
M (SD)
1.68 (1.70)
1.76 (1.69)
1.93 (1.70)
2.22 (1.88)
1.87 (2.01)
1.88 (1.84)
1.57 (1.48)
1.64 (1.57)
1.39 (1.24)
1.49 (1.39)

Populace
M (SD)
3.35 (2.84)
2.31 (2.25)
2.83 (2.68)
2.86 (2.47)
4.88 (3.03)
5.31 (2.95)

Populace
M (SD)
1.61 (1.62)
2.29 (2.19)
1.67 (1.78)
1.49 (1.40)
1.33 (1.04)
a

Joyriding
Upper class
M (SD)
1.69 (1.73)
2.61 (2.55)
1.81 (1.99)
1.47 (1.28)
1.42 (1.5)
a

a

a

a

a

Suicide
Populace
M (SD)
2.20 (2.21)
1.90 (1.98)
2.05 (2.11)
2.01 (1.99)
2.71 (2.55)
3.12 (2.58)

a

Upper class
M (SD)
2.46*** (2.51)
2.36*** (2.47)
2.17 (2.34)
2.40*** (2.42)
3.18*** (2.91)
3.76 (3.03)

a
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Items
World
Africa
America
Asia
Europe
Oceania
Items
World
Africa
America
Asia
Europe
Oceania

Driving under influence
Populace
Upper class
M (SD)
M (SD)
1.57 (1.54)
1.73*** (1.68)
1.80 (1.73)
2.01 (2.14)
1.65 (1.74)
1.82* (1.79)
1.48 (1.37)
1.60 (1.50)
1.47 (1.31)
1.76* (1.62)
a

Populace
M (SD)
2.85 (2.55)
3.55 (3.02)
2.95 (2.69)
2.79*** (2.44)
2.46 (2.16)
a

a

Lying
Upper class
M (SD)
2.90 (2.47)
3.99 (2.93)
3.14 (2.67)
2.45 (2.07)
3.21*** (2.56)
a

Buying stolen goods
Populace
Upper class
M (SD)
M (SD)
1.82 (1.77)
1.87 (1.89)
1.82 (1.76)
1.84 (1.91)
1.78 (1.78)
1.85 (1.90)
1.77 (1.69)
1.85 (1.85)
1.89 (1.83)
1.93 (1.93)
1.60 (1.48)
2.56 (2.73)
Populace
M (SD)
2.43 (2.43)
2.92 (2.82)
2.88 (2.76)
1.89 (1.87)
2.42 (2.29)
a

Adultery
Upper class
M (SD)
2.58* (2.43)
2.83 (2.49)
3.11 (2.77)
1.96 (1.82)
3.17** (2.79)
a

Political assassination
Populace
Upper class
M (SD)
M (SD)
1.86 (1.96)
1.88 (1.92)
2.35 (2.30)
2.74 (2.66)
1.80 (1.98)
1.78 (1.89)
1.93 (1.97)
1.84 (1.80)
1.66 (1.69)
1.70 (1.72)
a

a

Failing to report a parking accident
Populace
Upper class
M (SD)
M (SD)
2.40 (2.36)
2.48 (2.36)
2.44 (2.15)
3.14** (2.72)
2.91 (2.77)
3.03 (2.72)
2.04 (1.92)
1.97 (1.84)
1.78 (1.83)
2.16 (2.09)
a

a

Keeping money found
Populace
Upper class
M (SD)
M (SD)
3.70 (3.20)
3.55 (3.03)
3.98 (3.20)
3.79 (2.90)
4.99 (3.52)
5.04 (3.33)
2.39* (2.19)
2.21 (1.96)
3.46 (3.05)
4.11* (3.26)
a

a

Note: Scale from 1 (never justifiable) to 10 (always justifiable).
a
No data for Oceania. *** < .001, ** <.01, * < .05, for significantly higher mean values.
A Africa: Ethiopia, Rwanda, Zimbabwe, Uganda, Tanzania, Zambia, Algeria, Libya, Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia, South Africa, Ghana, Mali, Nigeria, Burkina Faso.
America: El Salvador, Guatemala, Mexico, Dominican Republic, Puerto Rico, Trinidad & Tobago, Canada, USA, Argentine, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela.
Asia: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, China, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Japan, South Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Viet Nam, Thailand, Bangladesh, India, Iran, Pakistan, Azerbaijan,
Armenia, Bahrain, Cyprus, Georgia, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Palestine, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Yemen.
Europe: Bulgaria, Belarus, Czech Republic, Hungary, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Ukraine, Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Sweden, Great Britain, Albania, Andorra, Bosnia,
Croatia, Italy, Montenegro, Serbia, Slovenia, Spain, Macedonia, Serbia & Montenegro, France, Germany, Netherlands, Switzerland.
Oceania: Australia, New Zealand.
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Table 4
Factor Loadings and Communalities, Based on Principal Component Analysis with Oblimin
Rotation for the 23 Morality Items of the WVS (n = 10969)
Moral Foundation
MFT Domains
Factors

Socially binding
Purity / Sanctity
Purity
(α = .73)

Homosexuality
Prostitution
Sex under legal age
Divorce
Euthanasia
Abortion
Fighting with the police
Suicide
Killing in self-defense
Claiming undue
government benefits
Cheating fare on public
transport
Cheating on taxes
Accepting a bribe
Joyriding
Taking soft drugs
Throwing away litter
Driving under influence
Buying stolen goods
Political assassination
Failing to report a parking
accident
Lying
Adultery
Keeping money found

Death
(α = .66)

-.83
-.70
-.47
-.42

.52
.68
.60
.50
.45
.48

Individualizing

Authority / Respect
Authority 1 Authority 2
(α = .64) (α = .85)

Communalities

Fairness /
Reciprocity
Cheat others
(α = .63)

.89

.73
.65
.46
.59
.52
.57
.49
.52
.52
.67

.74

.60

.55

.51
.53
.57
.55
.53
.60
.58
.50
.41

.41
.52

.65
.70
.60
.74
.76
.62
.65

-.41

.65
.44
.76

.56
.49
.62

Note: |Factor loadings | < .4 are removed. Boldface indicates items kept for consistency measures

Exploratory factor analysis
To determine if the 23 observed morality items combine into morality latent constructs, I
proceed in two steps: first, I explore if the 23 variables split into factors corresponding to the
MFT domains at face validity; then, I use confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) to test if the
identified factors demonstrate convergent and discriminant validity, and if they are invariant
by group, so they can be compared.
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Principal components analysis with oblimin rotation was applied on the 23 morality
items for the full sample, leading to five factors2 (Table 4). The first factor invokes the “purity”
aspect of the moral foundation, as it deals with sexual behaviors. The second factor includes
items about death and is therefore related to sanctity (α = .66). The next two factors evoke
cheating the administration (α =.64), and breaking social rules without especially hurting or
being unfair to others (α = .85): they relate to the authority/respect domain and are labelled
“authority 1” and “authority 2.” Political assassination, which loads on authority 2, is removed
as it lacks face validity with this domain. The last factor suggests a relationship to
fairness/reciprocity, as it evokes cheating other individuals (α = .63). Finally, the item failing
to report a parking accident is not used because loadings are < .4.
Confirmatory factor analysis
The confirmatory factor analysis proceeds in three steps: first, CFA is applied on the full
sample (after data screening and listwise removal of missing-at-random values) and
optimized according to modification indices; then, the adjusted model is applied to populace
and upper-class groups separately to confirm fit; finally, model invariance across the two
groups is tested, to allow the comparison of their mean values (He & van de Vijver, 2012).
The initial model’s goodness of fit is low (see Table 5). The model is therefore
optimized using modification indices, adding error terms covariance, and removing items
with loadings < .4 (Jackson, Gillaspy, & Purc-Stephenson, 2009). The “purity” and “death”
constructs are combined into a single latent variable labelled purity/sanctity, because their
correlation is > .85 (Kline, 2005). Although they both relate to the authority/respect domain,
the “authority 1” and “authority 2” constructs are discriminated (r = .73), implying cheating
on social benefits and public services is assessed differently from breaking the law. The
adjusted model (Figure 1) using 17 morality items demonstrates acceptable fit with the data
(χ2[104] = 2101.15, p < .001; χ2[104] = 20.20; CFI = .966; NFI = .964; RMSEA = .042),
acceptable convergence (standardized loadings > .43; Kline, 2005), and discriminant validity
between constructs (correlation between constructs < .73; Kline, 2005). To allow betweengroup comparison, invariance is verified using the decrease in CFI from configural to metric,
and to scalar models (Cheung & Rensvold, 2002)3. Both metric and scalar invariance are
obtained on the whole sample (see Table 5).
2

3

Listwise non-missing sample is large enough to run the analysis: n = 10969, and culturally
representative as only Oceania respondents are missing. The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of
adequacy is .93 (above the recommended value of .6), and Barlett’s test of sphericity is significant,
χ2 (253) = 82074.55, p < .001, thus factor analysis was considered feasible with the 23 items.
Principle component analysis provided five factors, but seven items load on two factors. To
achieve a simpler structure, Oblimin rotation with Kaiser Normalization is applied and produces
an identifiable solution with five factors. Finally, the communalities (all > .3) indicate items share
variance with each other (Table 3).
In order to compare means between groups (i.e. populace and upper class), constructs should
demonstrate full score (or scalar) equivalence (He & van de Vijver, 2012). The analysis proceeds
in three steps: first a configural model (using the two groups) is created for baseline. For testing
metric invariance, only factor loadings are fixed across groups, and the decrease in fit from the
configural to this “metric” model is tested. The non-significance of fit difference indicates
measurement weights for populace and for upper class do not differ. For testing scalar invariance,

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2011

17

Online Readings in Psychology and Culture, Unit 4, Subunit 4, Chapter 9

Table 5
Summary of Model 2 Fit and Invariance for Groups Populace and Upper Class
Model
Initial model- full
sample
Optimized model - full
sample
Single group model –
populace b
Single group model upper class b
Configural invariance
Metric invariance
Scalar invariance
a

n

χ2

df

NFI

RMSEA

CFI

10969

9296.74

179

.874

.068

.877

10969

2101.15

104

.964

.042

.966

8539

1733.54

104

.963

.043

.965

1084

423.76

104

.936

.053

.951

9623
9623
9623

2157.45
2195.13
2336.30

208
221
238

.960
.959
.957

.031
.030
.030

.964
.963
.961

ΔCFI a

-.001 *
-.003 *

ΔCFI = CFI metric - CFI configural for metric invariance. ΔCFI = CFI scalar - CFI configural for scalar invariance.
class information is missing for n = 1346 respondents. * ΔCFI < .01 (Cheung & Rensvold, 2002).

b Social

The same invariance test is conducted on each country-wave case, with the optimized
model (four constructs) in cases where all observable variables are available (eight cases).
For cases where the 17 morality items are not available, a simplified model (including the
eight items for the purity/sanctity and the authority 1 constructs) is used for invariance test.
A total of 159 cases with non-missing variables are tested, among which a) for 80 cases the
upper class sample size is too small to run the invariance test, b) for three cases the
invariance tests cannot be rejected, and c) for 75 cases (49 countries, n = 106053) both
metric and scalar invariance are obtained. Only these cases are used in the next sections
(for the list of 75 cases, see note in Table 6).

Results
The primary goal is to analyze the extent of the morality gap between upper classes and
others. Because measures’ means and variances of morality are expected to vary within
country (Gibbs et al., 2007; Haidt, 1995; Haidt et al., 1993; Miller & Bersoff, 1992; Shweder

both factor loadings and intercept are fixed equal across groups in a “scalar” model. The absence
of significant difference in fit between the configural and the scalar models demonstrates the latent
constructs would produce same observable measures for populace and for upper class, and only
if this condition is fulfilled, can straightforward group mean comparison be realized (He & van de
Vijver, 2012). Typically, χ2 difference between models is tested to confirm significance in fit
difference. This method cannot be used here, as χ2 for each model and subsequently Δχ2 between
models are always significant due to large sample sizes. For large sample sizes, Cheung and
Rensvold (2002) propose instead to analyze the decrease in CFI between models: ΔCFI < .01
indicates the null hypotheses for the tested invariance should not be rejected.
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Figure 1. Optimized morality model with standardized loadings

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2011

19

Online Readings in Psychology and Culture, Unit 4, Subunit 4, Chapter 9

et al., 1987; Snarey, 1985), respondents’ measure of morality is standardized as a z-score
by country and wave (Fischer, 2004). Then for each country-wave case, the mean value for
upper-class respondents’ z-scores is compared to the mean value for the remaining (or
populace) respondents’ z-scores, using a Welch t-test as the two groups have different
sample sizes (Welch, 1947).

Morality Gap Between Upper Class and Populace
Purity/sanctity (75 cases)
The z-score comparison between upper-class and populace respondents is done on the
purity/sanctity for each case. Among the 75 cases, upper classes provide significantly higher
justification on 15 cases. Although significance is not reached, upper-class respondents
justify the “immoral” behaviors more than populace in most cases (61/75). Reversely, upperclass respondents show significantly less justification than non-upper-class respondents on
only two cases.
Authority/respect (75 cases)
The z-score comparison between upper-class and populace respondents is done on
authority 1 constructs for each case. Among the 75 cases, upper classes provide
significantly higher justification on 8 cases. Although significance is not reached, upper-class
respondents justify the “immoral” behaviors more than non-upper-classes in most cases
(47/75). Reversely, upper-class respondents show significantly less justification than nonupper-class respondents on seven cases.
Fairness/reciprocity (eight countries, wave 1989-1993)
The z-score comparison between upper-class and populace respondents is done on the
cheating others construct for the available eight cases. Upper classes justification of moral
constructs is higher for 5/8 cases, and significantly so for Argentina and Spain (ds = .25). In
none of the countries are upper classes significantly less justifying.
In conclusion, compared with the populace of their own country, respondents who
identify as upper-class generally show more lenience for all moral constructs, not only in the
socially binding domains of authority/respect and purity/sanctity, but also in
fairness/reciprocity. The results confirm prior literature arguing that power might encourage
individuals to take more risks (e.g., Anderson & Galinsky, 2006; Galinsky et al., 2008),
because they have a heightened sense of control (Kraus et al., 2012) that inhibits threatdriven obedience to rules (Piff et al., 2012). But especially the results provide novel evidence
that upper classes see the morality of purity/sanctity with more lenience than other classes.
As proposed by morality scholars, upper classes might “moralize" sexuality and deathrelated behaviors less than other classes (e.g., Horberg et al., 2009).
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Geographical Variations in Morality Gap.
To shed light on regional differences and confirm the morality gap outside of WEIRD
countries, the 75 cases are grouped into sub-regions (link to Table 6).
On purity/sanctity, the mean value for the upper classes is higher (or more lenient)
than that of other classes in 15/18 sub-regions and significantly so in 8/18 sub-regions:
South and Western Africa, North and South America, Southeast and Southern Asia, and
Northern and Southern Europe (.32 > ds > .11). On authority/respect, the mean value for
the upper classes is higher than that of other classes in 13/18 sub-regions, and significantly
so in 5/18 sub-regions: Western Africa, North America, Central Asia, Southeast and
Southern Asia, and Southern Europe (.55 > ds > .09). Finally, on fairness/reciprocity, the
mean value for the upper classes is higher vs. other classes in 4/6 sub-regions, and
significantly so in one sub-region: Southern Europe (d = .25). Only in one sub-region was
the upper classes’ justification significantly lower other classes (in Western Asia, for
authority/respect, d = -.13). The review of results by sub-regions confirms a tendency for
upper class to be more lenient than populace in many regions of the world beyond WEIRD
countries.
Do the results support the unrestricted low morality hypothesis, or rather the selective
low morality hypothesis, which states that upper classes in highly developed countries might
display lower morality in socially binding domains (e.g., purity/sanctity and
authority/respect), but not in individualizing (e.g., fairness/reciprocity) domains? Among
countries where fairness/reciprocity was measured, Spain and Japan were classified as
“high income,” India and Nigeria as “lower middle income,” and other countries as “upper
middle income” (World Development Indicators for year 1990, The World Bank). In high
income countries, Japanese upper classes were stricter (vs. populace) on both domains (d
< -.02), and Spanish upper classes were significantly more lenient (vs. populace) on both
domains (d > .24). In lower income countries, Indian upper classes were more lenient in
authority/respect (d = .04), but less lenient (vs. populace) on fairness/reciprocity (d = -.09),
whereas Nigerian upper classes were more lenient (vs. populace) on both domains (d > .02).
Such results do not confirm the “selective” morality loss of upper classes in developed
countries, but rather lend support to an unrestricted low morality hypothesis, independent
from the level of economic development. Nevertheless, the relative loss of morality of upper
classes is not universal, and societal variables might arguably moderate this general
tendency.

Changes in Morality Over Time
Is the gap between upper classes and the others widening or narrowing over time? To
answer this question, multi-wave constructs (purity/sanctity and authority/respect) and multiwave country samples (43 cases, 17 countries with at least two waves) are used.
Fairness/reciprocity is not included in the analysis, as only one wave is available. First, the
analysis is pursued with the 43 cases’ means for upper-class respondents’ z-score:
regression is run on this sample of 43 values to determine if upper classes’ morality becomes
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Table 6
Mean Values of the Moral Constructs (Standardized by Country and Wave), with 95%
Confidence Intervals, for Cases with Scalar Invariance (n = 106053) for Populace and
Upper Class.
Populace
M (SD)

Upper Class

Welch’s

M (SD)

t-test (df)

Purity/Sanctity
Eastern Africaa1
North Africa a2
South Africa a3
Western Africa a4
Central America a5
Latin America a6
North America a7
South America a8
Central Asia a9
East Asia a10
South East Asia a11
Southern Asia a12
Western Asia a13
Eastern Europe a14
Northern Europe a15
Southern Europe a16
Western Europe a17
Oceania a18

-0.00 (0.73)
0.00 (0.70)
-0.00 (0.85)
-0.01 (0.80)
-0.01 (0.77)
0.00 (0.73)
0.00 (0.74)
-0.00 (0.74)
-0.01 (0.68)
-0.01 (0.70)
-0.00 (0.68)
-0.00 (0.78)
-0.01 (0.76)
0.00 (0.67)
-0.00 (0.71)
0.00 (0.67)
-0.01 (0.72)
-0.00 (0.74)
-0.00 (0.74)

0.11 (0.81)
-0.01 (0.49)
0.25 (1.10)
0.15 (0.80)
0.17 (0.90)
0.09 (0.77)
-0.07 (0.61)
0.25 (0.86)
0.15 (0.75)
0.11 (0.82)
0.06 (0.71)
0.20 (0.91)
0.08 (0.90)
-0.01 (0.62)
0.11 (0.82)
0.22 (0.72)
0.27 (0.94)
0.10 (0.70)
0.15 (0.86)

-8.43 (106051)
0.14 (1525)
-1.35 (1807)
-3.09 (10819)
-3.73 (5607)
-1.59 (6115)
1.16 (2705)
-2.38 (5278)
-4.57 (14306)
-0.93 (988)
-1.19 (2699)
-2.70 (6148)
-2.87 (12127)
0.36 (10359)
-1.55 (6708)
-2.10 (3639)
-3.70 (6953)
-1.53 (5159)
-0.84 (3085)

Authority/Respect a
Eastern Africa a1
North Africa a2
South Africa a3
Western Africa a4
Central America a5
Latin America a6
North America a7
South America a8
Central Asia a9
East Asia a10
South East Asia a11
Southern Asia a12
Western Asia a13
Eastern Europe a14
Northern Europe a15
Southern Europe a16
Western Europe a17
Oceania a18

-0.00 (0.79)
0.00 (0.87)
0.00 (0.81)
-0.01 (0.86)
-0.01 (0.80)
-0.00 (0.74)
0.00 (0.74)
-0.00 (0.79)
0.00 (0.73)
-0.02 (0.79)
0.00 (0.73)
-0.00 (0.81)
-0.01 (0.78)
0.00 (0.79)
-0.00 (0.79)
0.01 (0.75)
-0.01 (0.79)
-0.01 (0.77)
0.01 (0.82)

0.04 (0.85)
-0.01 (0.92)
0.08 (0.92)
0.05 (0.87)
0.13 (0.87)
0.02 (0.74)
0.00 (0.69)
0.24 (1.05)
-0.04 (0.71)
0.45 (0.90)
-0.03 (0.70)
0.19 (0.86)
0.07 (0.91)
-0.10 (0.87)
0.01 (0.81)
0.04 (0.82)
0.16 (0.95)
0.04 (0.89)
-0.14 (0.77)

Fairness/Reciprocity
Western Africa b1
Central America b2
South America b3
East Asia b4
Southern Asia b5
Southern Europe b6

-0.00 (0.75)
-0.00 (0.74)
-0.09 (0.77)
-0.00 (0.73)
0.00 (0.86)
0.01 (0.72)
-0.01 (0.77)

0.01 (0.74)
0.01 (0.71)
0.08 (0.82)
0.03 (0.75)
-0.01 (0.77)
-0.05 (0.64)
0.20 (0.86)

Moral domains
by sub-region

95% CI
LL

UL

<.001
ns
ns
.002
<.001
ns
ns
.020
<.001
ns
ns
.008
.004
ns
ns
.041
<.001
ns
ns

-0.15
-0.19
-0.64
-0.25
-0.28
-0.19
-0.05
-0.46
-0.22
-0.37
-0.16
-0.35
-0.15
-0.05
-0.26
-0.43
-0.42
-0.24
-0.53

-0.09
0.21
0.13
-0.05
-0.09
0.02
0.19
-0.04
-0.09
0.14
0.04
-0.06
-0.03
0.07
0.03
-0.01
-0.13
0.03
0.22

Cohen’s
d
.14
.02
.26
.19
.22
.11
-.11
.31
.21
.15
.09
.24
.11
.02
.15
.31
.32
.14
.19

-3.11 (106051)
0.06 (1525)
-0.51 (1807)
-1.01 (10819)
-3.00 (5607)
-0.50 (6115)
-0.01 (2705)
-1.91 (5278)
1.29 (14306)
-3.40 (988)
0.56 (2699)
-2.64 (6148)
-2.32 (12117)
2.43 (10359)
-0.21 (6708)
-0.28 (3639)
-2.28 (6953)
-0.56 (5159)
0.90 (3085)

.002
ns
ns
ns
.003
ns
ns
.061
ns
.001
ns
.009
.021
.016
ns
ns
.024
ns
ns

-0.07
-0.36
-0.40
-0.15
-0.23
-0.13
-0.14
-0.50
-0.02
-0.75
-0.07
-0.33
-0.13
0.02
-0.16
-0.27
-0.32
-0.22
-0.19

-0.02
0.38
0.24
0.05
-0.05
0.08
0.14
0.01
0.10
-0.19
0.13
-0.05
-0.01
0.19
0.13
0.20
-0.03
0.12
0.48

.05
-.01
.09
.06
.17
.03
.00
.26
-.05
.55
-.04
.23
.09
-.13
.02
.04
.19
.07
-.18

-0.66 (9621)
-0.17 (860)
-1.10 (1183)
-0.68 (3669)
0.24 (798)
1.57 (2156)
-2.10 (945)

ns
ns
ns
ns
ns
ns
.039

-0.06
-0.18
-0.24
-0.12
-0.12
-0.02
-0.40

0.03
0.15
0.07
0.06
0.15
0.14
-0.01

.02
.02
.11
.04
-.02
-.09
.25

p

Note. CI = confidence interval; LL = lower limit; UL = upper limit; ns = no significant difference (p > .1). Boldface
for significant difference between upper-class and populace. Boldface red for upper-class significantly less
justifying than populace.
a Measured with the construct authority 1.
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a1 Eastern Africa: Rwanda (Wave 6). a2 North Africa: Libya (W6). a3 South Africa: South Africa
(W3/W4/W5/W6). a4 Western Africa: Mali (W5), Nigeria (W2/W3/W4).
a5 Central America: Mexico (W2/W3/W4/W6). a6 Latin America: Dominican Republic (W3), Puerto Rico (W3),
Trinidad & Tobago (W5). a7 North America: Canada (W5), USA (W3/W4/W5). a8 South America: Argentina
(W1/W2), Brazil (W2/W5), Chile (W2/W5), Columbia (W3/W6), Venezuela (W4).
a9 Central Asia: Kyrgyzstan (W4). a10 East Asia: China (W1), Hong Kong (W6), Japan (W2). a11 South East
Asia: Malaysia (W5), Philippines (W3/W4/W6), Singapore (W4). a12 Southern Asia: India (W2/W4/W5/W6) , Iran
(W4/W5), Pakistan (W6). a13 Western Asia: Azerbaijan (W3/W6), Armenia (W3), Cyprus (W5), Georgia (W3),
Turkey (W5).
a14 Eastern Europe: Moldova (W4/W5), Poland (W3), Romania (W3/W5), Russia (W3), Ukraine (W5). a15
Northern Europe: Finland (W5), Norway (W3), Sweden (W5). a16 Southern Europe: Bosnia (W3/W4), Croatia
(W3), Montenegro (W4), Slovenia (W5), Spain (W2), Serbia & Montenegro (W1). a17 Western Europe: Germany
(W5), Netherland (W6), Switzerland (W3/W5).
a18 Oceania: Australia (W3/W5).
b1 Western Africa: Nigeria (W2). b2 Central America: Mexico (W2). b3 South America: Argentina (W2), Brazil
(W2), Chile (W2), b4 East Asia: Japan (W2). b5 Southern Asia: India (W2). b6 Southern Europe: Spain (W2).

more lenient (i.e., the mean value increases) with increasing wave values. For the 17
countries, I also compare the earliest case’s means with the latest case’s means, to estimate
change. Second, the analysis is done at the respondent level, for the 17 countries
individually, to shed light on geographical variations.
Linear regression is applied on the 43 cases’ means for upper classes on both
constructs, with wave number (1 = 1981-1989 to 6 = 2010-2014) as a predictor. Wave does
not predict cases’ means for purity/sanctity (p = .195) but does predict an increase in cases’
mean for authority/respect (β = .27, t(41) = 1.77, p = .084), and explains a significant
proportion of variance (R2 = .07, F(1,41) = 3.13, p = .084). See Figures 2 and 3 for illustration.
In addition, a t-test comparison was run between cases’ means for upper classes on the
earliest and the latest wave by country. Although there is an increase in upper classes’
country mean between the oldest waves (for purity/sanctity M = 0.09, SD = 0.15; for
authority/respect M. = 0.04, SD = 0.19) and the newest waves (respectively M = 0.19, SD =
0.22; M = 0.12, SD = 0.27), the difference does not reach significance (ps > .120) probably
because of the small sample size, which invites for a country-by-country review.
The regression analysis was run on the z-scores of upper-class respondents, for
each of the 17 countries with multi-wave data (see additional Figures in the supplementary
file). Wave significantly predicted an increase of upper classes’ justifying more purity/sanctity
in Chile (β = .35, t(150) = 4.58, p < .001) and in India (β = .13, t(768) = 3.66, p < .001), but
a decrease in Brazil (β = -.15, t(136) = 1.78, p = .078). Wave was not a significant predictor
of purity/sanctity for other countries (ps > .129). Wave also significantly predicted an
increase of upper classes’ justifying more authority/respect in Brazil (β = .18, t(136) = 2.08,
p = .040), in India (β = .21, t(768) = 5.98, p < .001), in Romania (β = .35, t(274) = 2.11, p
= .043) and in the USA (β = .32, t(52) = 2.40, p = .020), but not in other countries (ps > .127).
In conclusion, the analysis of time-trends seems to indicate a progressive widening of the
morality gap between upper classes and other classes in few tested countries, on both
domains of purity/sanctity and authority/respect. The narrowing of morality gap was only
observed in Brazil for purity/sanctity.
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Figure 2. Trend of z-scores for upper-class and populace on purity/sanctity. (CI = Confidence
Interval. Populace in plain lines, upper class in dotted lines).

Figure 3. Trend of z-scores for upper-class and the populace on authority/respect. (CI =
Confidence Interval. Populace in plain lines, upper class in dotted lines).
https://scholarworks.gvsu.edu/orpc/vol4/iss4/9
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Limitations
The study has several limitations. First, the research exclusively uses a set of questions
from the WVS that were not directly designed to assess the moral foundation questionnaire
itself. As such, this study only provides a good assessment on purity/sanctity,
authority/respect, and fairness/reciprocity domains, but ignores harm/care and in-group
loyalty. A wider range of measures that fully represent the moral foundation theory should
be analyzed in the future. Another inherent limitation is the self-reporting aspect of WVS
responses. Finally, the causality of the morality-power link remains unclear: although
experimental studies have demonstrated the effect of power on individuals’ moral judgment,
research is lacking as to whether those who disregard morality have an advantage in
accessing power, or not.

Conclusions
The objective of this study was not to compare morality across cultures, but to expand
research on the power-morality link outside of WEIRD countries (Henrich et al., 2010). The
WVS database reveals that upper-class respondents (vs. other classes) are less strict on
various aspects of morality (e.g., driving drunk, receiving bribes, fighting with the police,
suicide, or prostitution). The variables provided in the WVS reveal latent moral constructs
aligned with the MFT (purity/sanctity, authority/respect, and fairness/reciprocity), and the
gap between upper and other classes is replicated on these constructs.
The morality gap is, however, not monolithic. Although the study demonstrates a link
between upper-class and lower morality, not all upper-class respondents differ from others.
For example, the upper-class respondents are significantly more likely than other classes to
justify a bribe. But the large majority of upper-class respondents still share the same opinion
as others: 67% of the upper-class vs. 74% for other classes considers bribing never
justifiable.
Second, geographical and time differences indicate that the class-related moral gap
is not a universal characteristic of every society: first, the moral gap between upper classes
and populace is not significant in all regions of the world and for each moral domain. Second,
class-related morality difference might be widening with time in some societies, but not all.
In conclusion, although upper classes are not always expressing moral divergence from
others, the gap is prevalent and widening in many of the world’s regions.
How, then, can those in positions of power be kept in check? Among WVS
respondents, those who perceive they belong to upper-class react less intensely to the
suggestions of illegal (e.g., taking drugs, drunk driving) and anti-social (adultery, cheating
on public transportation) behaviors, probably because the perception of status and power
promotes disinhibition as well as self-interest (Keltner et al., 2003; Fiske, 1993). However,
upper-class respondents from several sub-regions (i.e., Western Asia, East Asia, Latin and
South America, and Oceania) displayed less lenience than other classes in few domains.
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Reducing or even reversing the morality gap is therefore feasible and should be pursued as
an avenue for further research.

Implications for Future Research
Like many other social occurrences, the social class divergence in morality requires
monitoring and corrective social action. Individuals who perceive they belong to the upperclass probably “moralize” less (Ellemer et al., 2008; Horberg et al., 2009) or perceive that
their social group obeys a different set of rules (Sidanius et al., 2000). Therefore, enforcing
social controls to ensure power holders are accountable to the whole society appears
necessary to ensure that they share the moral judgment of others (e.g., Pitesa & Thau,
2013). A domain-by-domain assessment of morality is however required because upperclass might be at the forefront of social progress when, for example, they challenge unequal
gender roles or discrimination based on sexual orientation. But when power holders’
attitudes defy general social rules, then distrust in elites, institutions, and in democracy itself
surges (Sandholtz & Taagepera, 2005). Societies where those in power are allowed too
much moral lenience may find themselves placed precariously on a slippery slope, as
population may growingly wonder why they should fulfill their side of the social contract.
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Recommended Videos
On the loss of empathy (or banality of evil) and the struggle with in-group loyalty, I
recommend Anna Arendt (film): https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KDO5u2YSbm
On the morality of power and the manipulation of youths, I recommend The Wave (Film):
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=N9vdfb2f-B0
On the morality of animals, I recommend the capuchin monkey fairness experiment:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-KSryJXDpZo

Questions for Discussion
1. Do animals have a sense of good and bad? In what species? Do you think animals’
sense of good and bad is innate or is learnt? What about humans: discuss if human’s
sense of good and bad is innate or learnt.
2. Can you think of morality items that are shared across countries, and items that differ by
country? What aspects of culture (e.g., individualism/collectivism) might have an
influence on morality?
3. Discuss how people of lower and higher social classes may have different sets of moral
judgment? Beyond education, how could social interaction (e.g., think of cooperation vs.
competition) change your moral judgment?
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4. Do animals have a sense of social hierarchy? In what species? What could be the
evolved benefit of such hierarchy? For humans what are the benefits of hierarchy? Of
cooperation?
5. Psychologists (and this article) mention a “paradox of power.” What does it mean?
6. Do you know famous people who behaved in immoral ways, in sports, politics, business,
clergy, and psychology? Why do you consider these behaviors to be immoral, and why
famous or powerful individuals might not feel the same way about morality?
7. Based on your experience, how would having power over other people make you change
your behavior, and ultimately, your moral judgment?
8. Do you see reasons why people who have power in our society (e.g., business and
political leaders) should be allowed to behave with moral leniencies? If you cannot see
any reason, what solutions could you propose (in business and in political practices) to
limit the immoral behavior of leaders?
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